American inetervention in vietnam Essay Example For Students

American inetervention in vietnam Essay During the Cold War, the United States of America was determined to act as the superior nation in the world. They believed that every country was inferior to them in regards to military power, economic stability and moral beliefs. After the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy, the Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took over in Washington. He was pressured to follow through on the late Presidents programs and policies on Vietnam which entailed the demonstration of Americas strength and responsibility. It is argued that American intervention in Vietnam was caused by structural weakness in the National Security Council and inadequate attention to long- range policy planning. In addition, Johnsons inexperience and naivety regarding foreign policy and the optimistic belief of creating a flawless world. A main cause of American involvement was the weakness of the mechanism for determining the framework of foreign policy. The establishment of the National Security Council came about in 1947. It was to bridge the gulf between considerations of foreign policy and considerations of the military force which was to conduct external relations.1 Apparently, the U.S.A. had had no central authority that linked the organizations of the Military Services and the State Department. As a result, the government decided that in order to be successful in international affairs the two groups had to work together. The NSC ensured detailed coordination of all major factors of U.S. foreign policy decisions.2 It was odd that both President Truman and Eisenhower had success with this organization and when Kennedy came to office he decided to change it. He preferred to rely on small groups to be responsible for policy formation and execution therefore, he was more comfortablewith a broad knowledge of foreig n affairs and a strong distaste for being hemmed in by too much organization.3 This informal system carried serious dangers of insufficient coordination, as the travesty at the Bay of Pigs soon showed and Johnson was unfortunate to inherit it.4 Lyndon Johnson had many vital decisions to make when he was in office. The fragmented NSC was not an efficient instrument since he had to conclude whether or not to continue supporting Vietnam militarily and economically. Our large-scale military entry into the Vietnam War in early 1965 reflected the piecemeal consideration of interrelated issues, and that this was the natural consequence of a fragmented NSC and a general inattention to long-range policy planning. Consultation, even knowledge of the basic facts, was confined to a tight circle of presidential advisors,and there appears to have been little systematic debate outside that group.5The White-House was primarily for action or reaction and not a place for reflective thought on difficult long-term problems, this was a result for an absence of comprehensive policy analysis.6 The Policy Planning Staff, during the years of 1961- 1966 tried to figure out a possible solution through the National Policy Papers. These papers set down responsible lines of policy for the U.S. government to follow. Apparently, the principal department heads, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, were unwilling to spend the personal time r equired to reach any agreement and furthermore, no one would take the time to read or endorse the Papers. The general inattention to long-range policy planning is demonstrated by the decisions and actions that marked the largescale military entry into the Vietnam War in early 1965 which reflected the piecemeal consideration of interrelated issues.7The United States was determined that bombing North Vietnam was a tactic of maintaining the conflict within boundaries. Hanoi was believed to surrender shortly after bombing and during the pauses, negotiations would take place. North Vietnam was convinced that bombing would not affect their behaviour and if they prolong the wartheir forces will grow stronger, the enemy forces will be weakened. Protracted negotiationswould erode its adversarys will.8 This illustrates the poor planning on U.S. governments behalf since they were convinced that their military force would have a great impact on Hanois decisions. Johnsons inability to effectively enforce leadership commands were evident during his term in office. This president portrayed no central guiding philosophy in foreign policy and there was confirmation of slackness in coordinating disparate elements. This was the result of little background and uncertainty in foreign affairs.9 Johnson lacked moral courage in the Vietnam conflict which illustrates his incapabilities to lead a country of great power. Even presidential aides were sceptical about Johnsons ability as a Vice-President. Kennedy had sent him on a special investigative mission to Saigon and the story was spread that Johnson,fearing he would be killed, had argued for two weeks against the journey: I dont want to embarrass you by getting my head blown off in Saigon. The young president supposedly answered: Thats all right Lyndon. If anything happens to you out there, Sam Rayburn and I will give you the biggest funeral in the history of Austin, Texas. Kennedys aidesnoted that th e vice-president agreed to go only if Kennedys sisterwent along to prove there was little danger.10Johnson inherited a loose and flexible organization which his personal existing characteristics did not match. His galvanic temperament, irregular administrative habits, and passion for secretiveness could or would have used a more formal structure to good advantage.11 It appeared that Johnson was incapable to deal with such an intricate dilemma in comparison to the previous presidents. File Sharing Systems EssayAmerican intervention in the Vietnam War stemmed from previous conflicts which they were involved in. The Cold War was unresolved since the States were determined to prevent Communist invasion over the world. It was ironic that a country with such a powerful reputation had weak organization. The fragmented National Security Council contributed to the poor strategy planning for Vietnam War. An attempt to combine the Military Services and the State Department was not successful during Johnsons term in office since it was proved to be an ineffective informal structure. As a President, Johnson had little background in foreign affairs and his lack of confidence contributed to the failure within the Vietnam conflict. Taking all matters into account it is apparent and predictably obvious that the United States had no concrete plan to win the War. Bibliography:Berman, Larry, Lyndon Johnsons War., New York, 1989. Brown, Weldon A., The Last Chopper., New York, 1976. Goodman, Allan E., The Lost Peace., Stanford, 1978. Hoopes, Townsend, The Limits of Intervention., New York, 1973. Turner, Kathleen J., Lyndon Johnsons Dual War., Chicago, 1985. The Pentagon Papers., Boston: Beacon Press, vol.3vol.4. ENDNOTES1.Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention. (New York,1973),p.2. 2.Ibid, p.33.Ibid, p.5. 4.Ibid, p.5. 5.Weldon A. Brown, The Last Chopper. (New York, 1976),p.6. 6.Hoopes, p.5. 7. Hoopes, p.7. 8.Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace. (Stanford, 1978), p.12. 9.Hoopes, p.210. Brown, p.7. 11. Hoopes, p.5. 12 Hoopes, p.8. 13. Hoopes, p.8. 14. Hoopes, p.12. 15. Hoopes, p.13. 16. Hoopes, p.14. 17. Hoopes, p.15. 18. Hoopes, p.16. 19. Hoopes, p.17. 20. Hoopes, Op.cit., p.1721. The Pentagon Papers. (Boston:Beacon Press) vol.3,p.715. 22. Hoopes, p.18. 23. Hoopes, Op.cit.,p.19. 24. Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnsons War.(New York,1989),p.9. 25. The Pentagon Papers.(Boston:Beacon Press) vol.4,p.641.